This paper examines the allocation of Variable Reenlistment Bonuses (VRB's) and Proficiency Pay (Pro Pay) among Navy ratings, i.e., occupation specialties. In particular, the assignment of these monetary incentives to reenlistment in the recent past is evaluated in terms of efficiency and effectiveness criteria. Subsequent papers will explore improved procedures for identifying Navy occupations, i.e., ratings, with shortages of personnel, and for assigning incentive pays such as the VRB and Pro Pay.
Additionally, attention will be given to economic factors influencing reenlistment rates to determine, for example, the extent to which current levels of VRB and Pro Pay are effective in raising reenlistment rates.
Background
As specified by the Department of Defense (DOD), personnel shortages in a military occupation specialty are determined by a measure known as the career manning ratio. The career manning ratio is a ratio of career inventory or strength to career requirements. Career inventory includes all This report was prepared under the Navy Manpower R&D Program of the Office of Naval Research under Contract Number N00014-67-A-0214-0016. + Thanks are due to Kate Arbogast for her assistance in collecting the data employed in this study.
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J enlisted personnel on active duty with more than four years service.
Career requirements are measured by extant enlisted billets in pay grade E-5 and above.
One means for increasing the supply of personnel to ratings experiencing shortages is to provide VRB's and Pro Pay. The VRB is payable, with some exceptions, in equal yearly installments during the reenlistment period on first reenlistment in specified occupations to individuals who are entitled to a regular first reenlistment bonus.
The VRB is based on multiples (one through four, the latter being the highest payment) of the regular first reenlistment bonus. Since the total of all regular reenlistment bonuses may not exceed $2,000, the maximum VRB is $8,000. Pro
Pay is a monthly payment paid to careerists in highly technical specialties of special importance to military needs where the maximum VRB is an insufficient retention incentive. This monthly addition to pay and allowances may be received over successive reenlistments but terminates when the occupation specialty no longer qualifies for Pro Pay. Although Pro Pay is only awarded for superior performance, in practice most individuals in a Pro Pay rating receive it.
In determining whether a rating is eligible for a VRB and/or Pro Pay, three factors are generally mentioned; these are the career manning 2 ratio, total training costs and training time.
Obviously, the formulation of explicit criteria for the assignment of VRB's and Pro Pay is not an easy task. As a first step it is useful to see how these monetary supplements to pay and allowances have been allocated in the recent past. This is the Regular reenlistment bonuses are lump sum payments awarded to enlisted personnel to induce them to reenlist. Unlike reenlistment bonuses which may be offered at the completion of any contract term, the VRB, which is an extra bonus, can be offered only for the first reenlistment. In this section empirical relationships between career manning 3 ratios, VRB's and Pro Pay are discussed.
In the discussion that follows, it is assumed that the career manning ratio is the best measure for identifying Navy ratings with shortages of personnel. The relationship between career manning ratios and other measures for identifying Navy occupations with personnel shortages, e.g., reenlistment rates, will be examined in a forthcoming paper.
The Department of Defense (DOD) categorizes career manning ratios into four groups as shown below. In Table 1 a/ DOD Group -1. Electronics equipment repairmen (11) 2. Communication and intelligence specialists (6) 3. Medical and dental specialists (2) 4. Other technical and allied specialists ( c/ -Percent of ratings providing a Variable Reenlistment Bonus.
DOD Group
-Percent of ratings providing Proficiency Pay.
-4 -
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During the last several years the number of ratings with personnel shortages has increased. As indicated by Table 2 -Information missing for three ratings.
In allocating VRB's and Pro Pay, it is desirable that they be assigned to ratings in an effective and efficient manner. Although the data in Table 1 indicate that, on the whole, the distribution of VRB's and Pro Pay is efficient and effective in that it is concentrated in the occupation groups with the highest proportion of ratings in a shortage status, further examination of the detailed ratings suggests that if the career manning ratio, total training cost and training time are used as the criteria for assignment, effectiveness and efficiency can be improved. This is indicated first for the VRB and then for Pro Pay.
Some evidence that the effectiveness and efficiency in allocation of VRB's can be improved is presented in Table 3 . As can be seen from this Table 4 in order to further assess the consistency of current VRB allocations.
In Table 4 , the ratings are classified into four groups depending on career manning code (CMC) and whether a VRB was offered in the rating.
Within each group ratings are distributed according to total training cost.
From this table it is seen that total training costs tended to be higher for ratings with a shortage of personnel, i.e., for ratings with a CMC of A or B for which a VRB was given (Group 2), than for ratings with a shortage for which no VRB was assigned (Group 1). Yet there were a number of ratings with shortages of personnel and low training costs that were assigned a VRB and some ratings with a shortage and high training costs that were not assigned a VRB. Additionally, there were ratings where no shortage of personnel was indicated and where a VRB was given (Group 4);
for these ratings the spread of training costs was very large. From Table 5 it is seen that Pro Pay was offered in seven ratings in 1971. In all but one of these there was a shortage of personnel and in all ratings a VRB was paid. Of 29 other ratings in which a VRB was quintiles (i.e., excluding ten percent of the ratings that have either very high or very low training costs per year), the range in annual training costs varied between $9,971 and $13,487. Of particular interest, the training cost per annum of stewards, $10,588, was only slightly less than that for aviation fire control technicians, $10,936.
However, of the six ratings with personnel shortages, only two had a career manning code A indicating a severe shortage of personnel.
-8 -TR-1146 5,001 -6,000
6,001 -7,000
7,001 -8,000
8,001 -9,000 9,001 and over e/ -Information missing.
-9 -TR-1146 The preceding discussion assumes that, given the career manning ratio, training time and total training cost, all shortages are of equal importance. In the long run this is true but in the short run it may be argued that some shortages are more important than others. Thus, for a
The ratings for which these conditions prevailed were as follows:
Fire Control Technician, Missile Technician, Air Controlman, Photographic
Intelligenceman, and Instrumentman.
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example, it may be that in the short run the readiness of the total Navy may be reduced more by an unfilled position aboard a destroyer or oil tanker than an unfilled position in a land-based communications center or storage facility, whereas in the long run, all things being equal such as training cost and time, the incremental gain in output resulting from the employment of an additional person in a specialty with a shortage is likely to be independent of the geographical location of the position being filled.
Granting the desirability of differentiating between shortages in the short run, the problem arises as to how to measure the importance of a shortage. For the Navy, the importance of a shortage depends, in part, on how the shortage affects Navy output. Given the current state of the art for measuring this magnitude, Navy output is often stated in terms of ship readiness. This suggests that the percentage of billets in an occupation which are sea jobs might serve as a rough approximation of the impact of a shortage of personnel in that occupation on overall ship readiness. This measure is used in Table 6 to determine the extent to which the assignment of VRB's has been influenced by the consideration of maximizing short run 9 Navy output.
The format of Table 6 is similar to that of Table 4 except that the row stubs show the ratio of sea/total billets for a rating. Ratings for which the sea/total billet ratio is greater (less) than 0.7 are considered to have a relatively large (small) impact on ship readiness. As can be seen from Table 6 , for the most part the ratio of sea/total billets is higher for ratings which have been assigned a VRB, for ratings with and without a personnel shortage. Thus, Navy practice in assigning VRB's (and Pro Pay) appears to be weighted toward increasing current ship readiness. that the regular reenlistment bonus, which is given for reenlistment in any rating whether it be a shortage or surplus rating, is to be phased out and the monies formerly used for this purpose are to be allocated to VRB's. As the VRB increases in importance, the problem of VRB allocation will become even more acute.
This paper has attempted to assess some of the influences underlying current Navy practice in assigning VRB's and Pro Pay. As indicated above, it appears that shortages of career personnel have increased in the Navy over the last several years and that in 1971 shortages of career personnel were experienced in over two-thirds of all ratings. The duration and range of shortages suggest that factors other than assignment of VRB's and Pro Pay account for these shortfalls. Nonetheless, assignment of these monetary ratings with a CMC of C or D, suggesting that the probability of a rating being short in career personnel may be independent of the proportion of all billets (in the rating) requiring sea duty. The influence of this and other factors on retention will be examined in another paper.
Indirect ways of maintaining differentials in pay exist, however;
for example, differential promotion rates within occupation. demand and yet a VRB was offered. Although the problem of quality of inputs to the VRB and Pro Pay decision process was only briefly examined, the data also suggest that improvement in this area is necessary, particularly in the estimation of annual training costs.
This study indicates the need for a procedure which results in the formulation of explicit assignment criteria that can be employed in a timely manner. One procedure to be explored in a follow-up paper is discriminant analysis. This approach is particularly appropriate in that it can provide a preference ranking of ratings for a VRB and Pro Pay in terms of such input variables as the career manning ratio, the reenlistment rate, total training cost, total training time, and the ratio of sea/total billets. In so doing, the weight of each input variable is given explicitly. The problem of assigning VRB's and Pro Pay is complicated by the fact that career manning ratios may not be the preferred measure for assessing whether a shortage of personnel exists in a rating. Alternative measures need to be examined and likewise will be discussed in the follow-up paper.
